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ABSTRACT
Exposure to misleading details following an eyewitnessed event often leads to
memory errors for these misleading details—a pattern termed the misinformation effect.
A recent debate is whether completing a memory test after a witnessed event, but before
exposure to misleading details, can reduce subsequent misinformation (a protective effect
of testing; PET) or increase subsequent misinformation (retrieval-enhanced
suggestibility; RES). We further evaluated the initial testing effects using witnessed
videos (vs. static images) which often yield a RES pattern and using household scenes
which often yield a PET pattern. Following study of four household videos (e.g.,
bathroom, bedroom, etc.) that depicted an actor interacting with a set of objects,
participants either completed an initial recall test or a filler task (no test control),
followed by exposure to misinformation in the form of false objects and a final recall and
source-monitoring test. Experiment 1 had participants complete the misinformation/final
test phases during the same experimental session, whereas Experiment 2 delayed the
misinformation/final test phases by 48 hours. In both experiments, initial testing
improved correct memory for presented objects in the videos but had no effect on
misinformation in either recall or source tests. Our results, therefore, indicate that while
testing can benefit correct memory, it does not produce a memory cost (i.e., RES) to
misinformation.
Keywords: Misinformation; Retrieval Enhanced Susceptibility; Protective Effect of
Testing; Videos; Delay; BFI

iv

DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my supportive friends and family who spent hours of
their time listening to me ramble on about my topic. I am beyond grateful for their love
and encouragement throughout my time at The University of Southern Mississippi.
And to my cats, Poppy, Hawthorne, Sabre, and Jersey, for which I received a
college education so I can give them a better life.

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Dr. Mark Huff, for the guidance
he has given throughout the process of writing this thesis. I would like to thank Nick
Maxwell for the time and effort he put into creating programs to run the experiments,
compiling the data that was gathered, and for his feedback. Finally, I would like to thank
the Drapeau Center for Undergraduate Research for the SPUR Grant that funded my
research and brought my thesis to fruition.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ xi
Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
The Present Study ......................................................................................................... 10
Experiment 1 ............................................................................................. 12
Methods......................................................................................................................... 12
Participants................................................................................................................ 12
Materials ................................................................................................................... 12
Procedure .................................................................................................................. 14
Results ........................................................................................................................... 17
Correct Recall ........................................................................................................... 17
False Recall ............................................................................................................... 18
Source-Monitoring Recognition ............................................................................... 18
Correlations with the Big-5 Personality Inventory ................................................... 20
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 21
Experiment 2............................................................................................ 24
Methods......................................................................................................................... 24
Participants................................................................................................................ 24
Materials ................................................................................................................... 24
Procedure .................................................................................................................. 25
vii

Results ........................................................................................................................... 25
Correct Recall ........................................................................................................... 25
False Recall ............................................................................................................... 26
Source-Monitoring Recognition ............................................................................... 26
Correlations with the Big-5 Personality Inventory ................................................... 27
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 28
General Discussion .................................................................................. 30
Limitations and Future Directions ................................................................................ 34
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 35
Figures and Tables .................................................................................. 36
IRB Approval Letter............................................................................... 43
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 44

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 .............................................................................................................................. 37
Table 2 .............................................................................................................................. 38
Table 3 .............................................................................................................................. 39
Table 4 .............................................................................................................................. 40
Table 5 .............................................................................................................................. 41
Table 6 .............................................................................................................................. 42

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 ............................................................................................................................. 36

x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

PET

Protective Effect of Testing

RES

Retrieval Enhanced Suggestibility

xi

Introduction
Memory researchers in both basic and applied settings have been interested in the
malleability of human memory at least back to the 1970s. One contributing factor is the
presence of misleading or false details about a previously experienced event which can be
incorporated into subsequent retrievals—a pattern termed the misinformation effect
(Loftus et al., 1978; Zaragoza et al., 2007). Misinformation is particularly problematic in
an eyewitness context in which witnesses, who are often queried (i.e., tested) for details
shortly after an event has occurred, must later recount a witnessed event after a delay
such as providing testimony in court. If eyewitnesses are susceptible to misinformation,
these errors could have drastic consequences. My thesis will further evaluate
misinformation effects on memory accuracy by examining whether completing an initial
memory test immediately following a witnessed video affects the susceptibility for
interfering misinformation details and whether misinformation is affected by the delay of
the initial test.
Misinformation paradigms generally follow a three-stage procedure in which
participants are presented with an original event, are exposed to misleading details about
that event, and are then tested for the original event. On the final test, participants are
more likely to report or endorse misleading false details relative to a group or condition
that is not presented with misleading details. The misinformation effect is reliable and is
found when misinformation is embedded both within a series of questions (Saunders &
Jess, 2010) and in a narrative form (Takarangi et al.,2006), occurs when the
misinformation originates from different sources aside from the experimenter including
highly credible sources (Numbers et al., 2014; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009), and social
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others, both real (Roediger et al., 2001) and perceived (Meade & Roediger, 2002; Huff et
al., 2013). The misinformation effect also persists after a delay following exposure to
misleading details (Frost et al., 2002; Schwartz & Wright, 2012), and is resistant to
warnings which can successfully reduce, but do not eliminate, the effect (Chambers &
Zaragoza, 2001; Eakin et al., 2003; Echterhoff et al., 2005). Indeed, nearly 50 years of
research has consistently confirmed that exposure to misleading details is costly to
subsequent memory accuracy and that this pattern generalizes across many different
contexts in both basic and applied settings.
Misinformation costs to memory have also encouraged research interest in methods
that may inoculate memory for the original event when exposed to false details. For
instance, a meta-analysis (Blank & Launay, 2014) has revealed that post-warnings, or
warnings that occur after misinformation is encountered but before a final test, can reduce
misinformation by more than 40% relative to unwarned conditions. Despite these
benefits, however, warnings may not be pragmatic to implement given it may be
unknown whether participants were exposed to incorrect information or not. Further,
warnings may also discourage participants from reporting details including those that
may be correct due to concerns that they may report incorrect information. Separately,
minimizing forgetting of the original event such as minimizing the delay between the
original event and misinformation exposure has been shown to reduce the misinformation
effect (Belli et al., 1992), as has ensuring participants have full attention available to
encode a witnessed event (Lane, 2006). Moreover, misinformation items that lend
themselves to successful memory monitoring are also less likely to be falsely
remembered than those that are not. For instance, misinformation effects are reduced for
2

misleading details that are central to an original event (Heath & Erickson, 1998; PazAlonso & Goodman, 2008; but see Dalton & Daneman, 2006, for a contrasting pattern),
and when misleading details directly contradict a specific detail from the original event
and are more likely to be detected as false (Huff & Umanath, 2018). However, like
warnings, eyewitness situations do not place the above conditions under the control of the
witness and are therefore unlikely to be applied in practice.
An ideal method for reducing misinformation would therefore be one that could be
applied following the witnessed event but prior to exposure, or potential exposure, of
misleading details. One such method that has received recent attention is that of initial
testing. Testing has been shown to be highly effective at enhancing retention for studied
materials over restudy (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006)—a pattern termed the retrievalpractice effect. Retrieval practice has been shown to facilitate the memory strength of
information that is initially retrieved (Kornell et al., 2011) which can slow its subsequent
forgetting. Several mechanisms have been used to account for testing benefits including
enhanced organization via relational processing (Congleton & Rajaram, 2012), the
implicit generation of mediators which could later be used as retrieval cues (Pyc &
Rawson, 2010), and improved memory strength of information that is initially retrieved
(Kornell et al., 2011). Regardless of the mechanisms, however, memory benefits
following testing are robust and have been found across a variety of materials, delays,
and test types (see Rowland, 2014 for a review and meta-analysis).
Paradoxically to the benefits of testing on facilitating correct memory, some
misinformation studies have reported that initial testing can reduce overall memory
accuracy by increasing suggestibility. This pattern was initially deemed a reversed testing
3

effect but has since been termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES; Chan et al.,
2009; Chan et al., 2017). In their initial study, Chan et al. (2009) had participants view an
episode of a television series which was either followed by an initial cued-recall test for
details within the episode, or no initial test. Following a post-event audio narrative that
contained details that were both misleading and consistent with details from the television
episode, participants who completed an initial test were more likely to false recall
misleading details than participants who did not complete an initial test. Subsequent
studies have reported the RES pattern using a variety of methodological conditions
including a week delay between study and misinformation phases (Chan & Langley,
2011), using different types of videos that differ in duration (40 min vs. 8 min; Whilford
et al., 2014), and when different initial test types are used including the cognitive
interview which is often promoted by researchers as a beneficial method for probing
memories for eyewitnesses (LaPaglia et al., 2014). RES may however be less likely to
occur when misinformation is presented via misleading questions rather than embedded
within a post-event narrative (LaPaglia & Chan, 2014). Regardless, RES produces a
memory cost that can occur despite well-established benefits of retrieval practice.
RES patterns are typically interpreted via two mechanisms which are not mutually
exclusive. First, the attentional account indicates that RES occurs because initial-test
participants approach the misinformation phase as containing corrective feedback and are
more likely to attend to misleading details. Consistent with the possibility, RES patterns
are eliminated (but not reversed) when participants are warned that a narrative may
contain false details (Thomas et al., 2010). Warnings may reduce the likelihood that
participants approach the narrative as containing corrective feedback and reduce attention
4

allocated to misleading items. Additionally, Gordon and Thomas (2014; see too Gordon
et al., 2020) reported that RES patterns were associated with longer reading times for
narrative statements with misleading details, suggesting greater attention is allocated to
false details. Separately, a test-potentiated learning account (Cho et al., 2017; Gordon &
Thomas, 2014; Pastotter & Bauml, 2014) posits that testing facilitates the encoding of
new information, which includes the encoding of subsequent misleading details.
Despite studies indicating that initial testing can be harmful to memory accuracy in
misinformation paradigms, a growing set of studies indicates that initial testing can
reduce misinformation, a pattern termed a protective effect of testing (PET; Huff et al.,
2013; 2016; Pereverseff et al., 2020). A PET effect was initially reported by Loftus
(1978) in which participants viewed a car accident scene and some of the participants
were questioned about the car’s color before being provided misinformation about the
color. During a final test, participants who were initially tested were more accurate in
retrieving the original color than those who were not, indicating a benefit of initial
testing. Loftus (1979) similarly proposed a “freeze effect” of initial testing, referring to a
set of pilot data in which completing an initial recall test for an initial event would make
the memory for this initial event more resistant to misinformation (see too, Howe, 1970,
for a “freezing” pattern in a repeated reproduction paradigm). More recently, the
cognitive interview, which was found to produce RES (LaPaglia et al., 2014), has also
been found to reduce later misinformation when completed before (vs. after) exposure to
misleading details (Memon et al., 2010). Other studies (Gabbert et al., 2012; Pansky &
Tenenboim, 2011) have shown this same reduction in misinformation following an initial
test. Taken together, initial testing can also reduce subsequent misinformation and
5

improve memory accuracy, consistent with the benefits of retrieval practice on correct
memory.
In the present study, my thesis will further examine the effects of initial testing on
subsequent misinformation using the social contagion of memory paradigm (Roediger et
al., 2001). The social contagion paradigm was initially adapted by Huff et al. (2013) to
evaluate initial testing effects on subsequent misinformation that was presented from a
social source. In their study, participants studied six static images of household scenes
(bathroom, kitchen, etc.) which contained a variety of objects. Following study, some
participants completed an initial free-recall test for objects in each scene, while other
participants completed a time-matched filler task (i.e., the no-test group). Both groups
then viewed a set of fictitious recall tests that were completed by “other participants from
a prior study” that contained false supplemental details (i.e., contagion items) that were
schematically consistent with the studied scenes. Exposure to these fake tests was
followed by a final free-recall test and a source-monitoring test (cf. Johnson et al., 1993)
in which participants were provided with a list of objects including the contagion items
and were tasked with specifying whether the objects were presented in the original
scenes, recalled by the participants, both, or not presented anywhere in the experiment.
On the final free-recall test, a retrieval-practice effect was found for correct recall, but
there was no difference in misinformation recall between the initial-test and no-initial-test
groups. On the source-monitoring test, however, a PET pattern was found in which initial
testing reduced the likelihood that participants would falsely ascribe the source of
contagion items to original scenes.
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Subsequent experiments using the household images in the social contagion paradigm
indicated that the PET effect on the source test is found when participants take one or two
initial tests and are exposed to misinformation either immediately after the initial test
phase or a 48-hour delay (Huff et al., 2016). A PET effect was also found on a free-recall
test, but only when the misinformation/final test phases were delayed. More recently,
Pereverseff et al. (2020), using the same social contagion paradigm found a source-test
PET effect when misleading items were embedded in both misleading questions and
narrative contexts, indicating that the mode of misinformation delivery produces a
consistent pattern.
Because initial testing can either increase or decrease suggestibility to
misinformation, researchers have attempted to reconcile these differences by evaluating
whether RES versus PET effects are unique to one type of methodology. One potential
factor is the type of initial and final memory tests that have been completed. Most RES
studies have used cued-recall tests (Chan et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2009; Thomas et al.,
2010), though RES has been found on several types of initial/final tests including free
recall (Wilford et al., 2014), source-monitoring (Chan et al., 2012), and the cognitive
interview (LaPaglia et al., 2014). Likewise, a PET pattern has been found using various
tests including cued-recall (Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011), free recall (Gabbert et al., 2012;
Huff et al., 2016; Loftus, 1979), recognition (Loftus, 1977), and source-monitoring (Huff
et al., 2013; 2016; Pereverseff et al., 2020). RES and PET patterns, therefore, appear to
be test-type invariant.
Differences in misinformation formatting have also been shown to be invariant to
RES and PET patterns. For instance, although many RES studies have embedded
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misinformation within a narrative format (Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; Chan et al., 2009;
2017; Thomas et al., 2010; Wilford et al., 2014), studies that have found a PET pattern
have utilized cued-recall questions (Gabbert et al., 2012; Lane et al., 2001; Pansky &
Tenenboim, 2011) or used the social-contagion paradigm (Huff et al., 2013; 2016).
Consistent with these differences, Chan and LaPaglia (2013; see too LaPaglia & Chan,
2019) reported that the presentation of misinformation in a written narrative induced a
RES pattern, but the presentation of misinformation in misleading questions induced a
PET pattern when participants initially viewed a video of a crime. However, Pereverseff
et al. (2020) similarly compared misinformation that was embedded in narratives or
misleading questions using the static images from the social-contagion paradigm. In two
experiments a PET effect was found on a final source-monitoring test for both types of
misinformation formats, indicating misinformation format may not be related to whether
initial testing is costly or beneficial to memory accuracy.
An additional possibility, and one that is investigated in the present study, is whether
the formatting of the original event—either as a presented video or as static images—may
be related to RES and PET patterns. RES studies generally use video clips as witnessed
events given their similarities to eyewitness scenarios (e.g., Chan et al., 2009; LaPaglia &
Chan, 2019), while studies that have found PET effects typically use static images, such
as slideshow pictures (Loftus 1978; Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011; Pereverseff et al.,
2020). Although one study has reported a PET pattern when using a crime simulation
video (Gabbert et al., 2012), it is possible that RES patterns may be more likely to occur
with video materials and PET patterns with static images. The purpose of the present
study is to further assess whether initial testing contributes to a PET or RES pattern but
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using video materials in the social contagion paradigm. Given Huff and colleagues (Huff
et al., 2013; 2016; Pereverseff et al., 2020) have consistently found evidence for a PET
pattern using static images in the social contagion paradigm, the present study maintains
the social contagion paradigm, but tests for RES and PET patterns following a witnessed
video.
Finally, previous research suggests that there may be a link between personality
factors and cognitive processes that may affect how participants process suggested details
in a misinformation paradigm. For example, Jackson and Balota (2012) reported that
individuals high in Conscientiousness showed improved mind wandering and were more
likely to remain on task in a sustained attention to response paradigm. This pattern
suggests that individuals high in Conscientious may have better tuned attentional control
and may be better able to focus on task-specific details. Given these attentional benefits,
one possibility is that high Conscientious individuals may have better attention towards
original event details and may be better able to detect misinformation when presented
with post-event information. If so, high Conscientious individuals may be less likely to
show suggestibility. More germane to misinformation effects however, Frost et al. (2013)
reported a positive relationship between Agreeableness and false endorsement of
misinformation details, particularly between Agreeableness questions pertaining to
compliance. Additionally, Gudjonsson (1983) reported a positive association between
Neuroticism and suggestibility. It is important to note that this latter relationship with
Neuroticism was not found by Frost et al., which might be due to Gudjonsson using a
different Neuroticism measure than what is commonly used in Big 5 studies, or that the
relationship with Neuroticism is unreliable.
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In the present study, the relationships between the Big 5 personality factors
(Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) are further
examined to test for the reliability of the patterns above. Focus is given to
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism, given these three factors have
shown positive associations with misinformation suggestibility in previous studies. It is
therefore predicted that these positive relationships will again be found but using a
different set of misinformation materials based on the social contagion paradigm.
The Present Study
In two experiments, the effects of initial testing on subsequent misinformation
suggestibility were evaluated using the social contagion paradigm. In Experiment 1,
participants studied a set of videos which depicted a female actor walking through four
household scenes (bathroom, bedroom, kitchen, and garage). These scenes contained a
variety of schema-consistent objects of which the actor interacted with a subset.
Following the presentation of the videos, half of the participants completed an initial
scene-cued free recall test (i.e., the test group) while the other half completed a filler task
(i.e., the no-test group). Following the initial test/filler phase, all participants were
presented with a series of fake recall tests ostensibly completed by other participants
which contained false items that were also schema consistent. After viewing the fake
recall tests, all participants immediately completed a final scene-cued free recall test and
a source recognition test where participants were required to specify the source for a set
of recognition test items. Finally, participants completed the BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017)
personality inventory. The experiment was closely modeled after Huff et al.’s (2013;
2016) experiments with the exception that household videos were used rather than static
10

household images. Overall, it was expected that if a RES pattern was due to the use of
initial videos as witnessed events, then initial-test participants would be more suggestible
to misleading items than no-test participants. However, if a PET pattern or a null effect of
initial testing was found, then the modality of witnessed event would not be a
contributing factor to when RES is found. Finally, an additional goal of the study was to
evaluate the relationship between BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017) factors and measures of
memory. As such, differences in false source responses and recall, and correct recall and
source responses were correlated with the BFI-2 factors, and the relationship in both
Experiments 1 and 2 were examined.
To provide a second test of whether initial testing following studied videos
contributes to RES or PET patterns, Experiment 2 closely followed Experiment 1 but
included a 48-hour delay between the initial test/filler task phase and the misinformation
phase. Because delayed tests often strengthen correct memory benefits of retrieval
practice (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Rowland, 2014), this delay was expected to
increase the magnitude of any testing effect on subsequent misinformation. Additionally,
the use of a delay was expected to improve the external validity of the experiments given
re-testing of witnesses often occurs following a delay rather than within a single study
session. It was therefore predicted that the results of Experiment 2 would follow
Experiment 1 but that the testing effect on correct memory and misinformation would be
exaggerated.
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Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Eighty participants were recruited through Prolific (www.prolific.co), an online
crowdsourced participant pool. Participants were compensated for the study at a rate of
$9.50 per hour. Participants were randomly assigned to the Initial Test group or the No
Test group (n = 40 per group), however data from two participants were removed—one
for extremely low performance (< 5% recall) and another due to a computer error which
did not present one of the scenes, leaving 39 participants in each group. All reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were proficient English speakers.
Materials
Study materials consisted of silent videos of household scenes and were taken
from Gretz and Huff (2019). The four silent videos depicted a female actor walking
through several common household rooms (bathroom, bedroom, kitchen, and garage)
while interacting with a set of household objects. These videos were based on static
household images used in the social contagion paradigm (Roediger, Meade & Bergman,
2001). The videos contained an average of 25.25 objects per video (range = 22–27), and
the objects were normed to be typical objects for each scene using 18 undergraduate
students (see Gretz & Huff, 2019, for norming information). Based on these norms, two
items for each scene that were rated by participants as being highly typical for a given
scene were excluded from each video. These items were designed as critical items and
were later suggested during the misinformation phase. Critical items consisted of the

12

following: toilet/lotion (bathroom), shoes/laptop (bedroom), blender/spatula (kitchen),
and scissors/rope (garage).
Misinformation was suggested via false objects embedded within fake recall tests,
which participants were informed had been completed by other participants during a
“previous study.” However, these tests were experimenter prepared and consisted of both
items that were initially presented in the scenes and the non-presented critical items. The
misinformation phase was modeled after Huff et al. (2013) who found elevated
misinformation rates when embedding critical items in fake recall tests. Participants
viewed the recall tests from four “other participants” that were presented electronically.
The number of items per test ranged from 6 to 10 total items (8 average). Critical items
were incorporated into recall tests from two of the scenes (misinformation scenes), while
tests from the other two scenes only contained correct items (control scenes). The scenes
that contained misinformation critical items (vs. control scenes) were counterbalanced
across participants. Critical items were always presented in test positions 4 and 6, while
the other test positions always contained correct items that were randomly sampled from
the scenes. Participants viewed four recall tests (one from each scene) for each of the four
fake participants for 16 total recall tests. For recall tests that contained critical items,
these were recalled by all four fake participants (i.e., participants received four exposures
to each critical item) to ensure a sizeable misinformation effect.
Participants completed a 42-item source monitoring test that contained items that
may or may not have been presented during the study phase. Participants were instructed
to report whether an item was touched by the actor, not touched, or not presented
throughout the videos.
13

Finally, the 60-item BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017) was used to gather personality
data about individual differences among the participants. This measure evaluates
openness, contentiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism by having
participants provide self-ratings of descriptive statements (e.g., “Is complex, a deep
thinker”). Participant responses were recorded using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (5) for each of the statements. Half of the items
were reversed scored.
Procedure
Data collection was completed online using Collector (Garcia & Kornell, 2015).
Figure 1 illustrates the study design. Following informed consent and collection of
demographics information, participants were instructed that they would view a series of
silent household videos that depicted an actor interacting with a variety of common
household objects. Participants were further informed that their memory for the objects in
the scene would be tested later and that they were to remember as many objects as
possible, regardless of whether the actor interacted with the object or not. Each video was
prefaced with a title screen denoting the location of the video (e.g., “Kitchen”) followed
by a screen that automatically played each video. Each video lasted approximately 45-50
s, and following the video’s presentation, a “Next” button was activated which allowed
participants to advance to the next title screen and video. Participants studied all videos in
the same order (bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, and garage).
Upon completion of the videos, participants completed an initial two-minute filler
task which consisted of naming as many U.S. states as they could from memory. After
the filler task, participants in the No-Initial Test group completed four additional filler
14

tasks (name as many celebrities as you can, name as many professional athletes, etc.).
Each additional filler task lasted two minutes, resulting in an additional of eight minutes
of filler task. Participants in the Initial-Test group were instructed to complete an initial
free-recall test for each household scene. For this test, participants were presented with a
screen with the name of the scene listed at the top and a dialogue box where they were to
report as many objects as they could remember from the scene regardless of whether the
object was touched by the actor or not. Participants were informed that spelling would
not be counted against them and that they would have two minutes to recall for each
video. Thus, time spent completing the free-recall tests in the Initial Test group was
equivalent to the filler tasks in the No-Initial Test group. Following each recall test,
participants advanced to the next test in which they were instructed to recall from a
different video. This procedure was repeated until the Initial Test participants completed
tests for all four videos.
After the No-Initial Test and the Initial-Test groups completed their filler tasks or
recall tests, respectively, both groups began the misinformation phase. During this phase,
participants were presented with misinformation in the form of four recall sheets which
participants were informed had been completed by other participants during a previous
study. However, these sheets were created by the researcher with false items embedded.
To ensure participants attended to the recall items, participants provided pleasantness
ratings for each item using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very unpleasant (1) to
extremely pleasant (5). Participants were not informed that these recall sheets contained
misinformation.
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Immediately following the misinformation phase, all participants completed a set
of final free-recall tests which followed the same format as the tests completed by
participants in the Initial-Test group. Following this test phase, participants then
completed a source-monitoring recognition test. This test presented participants with a
test object, and participants were asked to determine whether the object was “touched” or
“not touched” by the actor in the original videos or whether the object was “not
presented” in the videos. The source test consisted of 42 items of which 12 were objects
that were correctly presented and touched by the actor (3 from each video), 12 correctly
presented objects that were not touched (3 from each video) 4 falsely suggested critical
items (2 from each misinformation scene), 4 critical items from the control scenes, and 10
household objects that were not presented in any of the videos or the fake recall tests
which served as controls. Participants were required to provide a response for each test
item. The source monitoring test was self-paced.
Following the source monitoring test, participants completed the 60-item Big Five
Inventory-2 (Soto & John, 2017), which consisted of 12 items assessing each of the Big
Five personality factors (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness). Responses were made using a 5-item Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree; 5 = strongly agree) and, like the source test, participants were required to make
a response for each item. Completion of this inventory was self-paced. Participants were
then debriefed regarding the study including the exposure to false items that were
embedded in the recall tests from other participants. A typical experimental session lasted
approximately 45 min.
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Results
An alpha level of p < .05 was adopted for all statistical tests. Effect sizes were
computed as partial-eta squared (ηp2) for all Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) and as
Cohen’s d for all t-tests.
Correct Recall
Proportions of correct recall for the No-Initial test group and the Initial Test group
for initial and final tests are reported in Table 1. A 2(Touched: Touched vs. NonTouched) × 2(Test: Initial Test vs. Final Test) repeated-measures ANOVA was first used
to examine recall differences within the initial-test group. Objects that were touched in
the videos were recalled at a higher rate than objects that were not touched (.47 vs. .23;
for the mean for touched and non-touched objects, respectively), F(1, 38) = 118.75, Mean
Squared Error (MSE) = .02, ηp2 = .76 and correct recall increased from the initial test to
the final test (.30 vs. .40), F(1, 38) = 78.57, MSE = .01, ηp2 = .67. An interaction was also
found, F(1, 38) = 4.85, MSE = .01, ηp2 = .11, which reflected a slightly larger increase on
the final test recall for non-touched than touched objects.
To test for the presence of a retrieval-practice benefit, a 2(Touched: Touched vs.
Non-touched) × 2(Test Group: Initial Test vs. No-Initial Test) mixed ANOVA was used
to compare final recall performance between the two test groups. Touched objects were
again recalled at a higher rate than non-touched objects (.46 vs. .25), F(1, 76) = 210.08,
MSE = .01, ηp2 = .73, and importantly, completing an initial test was found to improve
correct recall overall relative to no-initial test (.40 vs. .32), F(1, 76) = 4.94, MSE = .05,
ηp2 = .06 – a benefit of initial testing (Huff et al., 2020; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). The
testing benefit was equivalent for touched and non-touched objects as the interaction was
17

not reliable, F < 1. Final recall for the No-Initial Test group was also compared to the
initial recall test in the Initial Test group. Only touched objects were recalled at a higher
rate than non-touched objects (.43 vs. .20), F(1, 76) = 215.42, MSE = .02, ηp2 = .74, and
there were no differences between the two tests as both the main effect of test type and
the interaction were not reliable, both Fs < 2.46, MSEs < .05, ps > .12.
False Recall
Proportions of falsely suggested objects recalled on the final recall test are
reported in Table 1. In this analysis, I compared proportions of false recall both in the
videos in which misinformation was later suggested (misinformation present) and control
videos in which misinformation was not encountered (control), the latter of which
represents a baseline of misinformation recall in the absence of its suggestion. A reliable
misinformation effect was found in recall in which suggested objects were falsely
recalled at a higher rate than control objects (.31 vs. .04), F(1, 76) = 64.05, MSE = .04,
ηp2 = .46. The main effect of test group was marginal, F(1, 76) = 3.21, MSE = .04, p =
.08, ηp2 = .04, but importantly, a significant interaction was found, F(1, 76) = 4.39, MSE
= .04, ηp2 = .06. Specifically, initial testing was found to increase misinformation falsely
recall relative to the No-Initial Test group, but only for scenes in which information was
presented (.37 vs. .24), t(76) = 2.05, Standard Error of the Mean (SEM) = .06, d = 0.46,
but not for control scenes (.03 vs. .04), t < 1. The increase in suggestibility for
misinformation present videos following initial testing is consistent with a RES pattern.
Source-Monitoring Recognition
Table 2 reports the proportions of source attributions for misinformation items as
a function of test group for each of the three source responses (whether the object was
18

“touched,” “not touched,” or “not presented” in the videos). Total false source
attributions were computed as misinformation items that were attributed as being either
touched or not touched as responding to either of these source responses indicated that
the participant was attributing the source of the object to the video.
To examine differences in total false recognition, a 2(Misinformation Type:
Presented vs. Control) × 2(Test Group: Initial Test vs. No-Initial Test) mixed ANOVA
was used. A reliable misinformation effect was also found on the source test as false
object attributions to the videos were higher for suggested misinformation objects than
control objects (.75 vs. .51), F(1, 76) = 30.49, MSE = .09, ηp2 = .29. Unlike the pattern
found in recall, however, testing had no effect on source misinformation, as neither the
main effect of test group nor the interaction were reliable (both Fs < 1). Correct source
attributions for misinformation objects (computed as “not presented” attributions) were
also analyzed. Correct attributions for misinformation objects did not differ between the
test and no-test groups both for objects that were suggested (.26 vs. .22) and for
misinformation control objects (.54 vs. .48), both ts < 1.
Correct source responses for objects that were presented in the videos were
similarly analyzed (touched objects correctly attributed as “touched”; non-touched
objects correctly attributed as “non-touched) as a function of test group. Proportions of
correct source responses are reported in Table 3. An effect of object type was found, F(1,
76) = 17.47, MSE = .05, ηp2 = .19, in which correct attributions were higher for touched
objects than non-touched objects (.62 vs. .47). A marginal effect of test group was found,
in which correct attributions were numerically greater in the Initial Test group than the
No-Initial Test group (.57 vs. .51), F(1, 76) = 3.32, MSE = .04, p = .07, ηp2 = .04. The
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interaction was not significant, F(1, 76) = 1.83, MSE = .05, p = .18. Thus, when taken
together with false attributions for misinformation items initial testing generally had no
effect on source recognition. Initial testing did not produce a RES pattern nor a PET
pattern and testing only marginally (but not significantly) increased correct source
attributions for objects that were presented in the videos.
Correlations with the Big-5 Personality Inventory
Individual differences in correct recall and source responses and false recall and
source responses to misinformation items were then correlated with the BFI-2 (Soto &
John, 2017). Mean BFI responses for each of the five factors as a function of test group
are reported in Table 4 and a correlation matrix is reported in Table 5. Given the study
goal of evaluating the relationships between the BFI-2 factors and memory measures,
correlation analyses reported here focus on the relationships with the memory measures,
but full correlations including those across the BFI-2 factors are reported in the
correlation matrix. In the analyses, correlations are collapsed across initial test groups to
maximize available statistical power to detect relationships. A separate analysis with test
group as a factor yielded no interactions (Fs < 1), providing statistical justification for a
pooled analysis.
Starting with correlations between misinformation recall and false source
attributions of misinformation items, only a marginal positive relationship emerged
between Agreeableness and false recall of misinformation items (r = .21, p = .06), with
all other correlations being non-significant (rs < .16, ps > .16). Although this pattern is
not reliable, it may suggest that individuals who are more agreeable may also be more
suggestible when presented with false information from a perceived social source.
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Moreover, this marginal pattern was only found on the free recall test (agreeableness was
not marginally related to misinformation source attributions; r = .03, p = .81) which may
indicate a potential test-type difference from when participants are freely able to retrieve
from memory versus test types that require specification of contextual details.
Turning to correct memory, no significant correlations were found between any of
the BFI-2 factors and touched recall or touched source attributions (rs < -.17, ps > .13).
However, for non-touched recall, a small positive relationship was found with
Neuroticism (r = .28, p = .01) as was a small negative relationship with
Conscientiousness (r = -.24, p = .04). A similar positive relationship with Neuroticism
was found for correct non-touched source attributions (r = .25, p = .03), however the
relationship with Conscientiousness was not reliable (r = -.18, p = .11). This consistent
pattern indicates that individuals who were generally more worried and anxious were
more attuned to non-touched objects as they were better able to recall them and correctly
retrieve their context on the source test. An additional relationship that emerged was a
negative correlation between Extraversion and correct non-touched source retrievals (r =
-.25, p = .03), which indicates that more introverted individuals are more likely to
remember the source of non-touched items. This pattern is speculated on further in the
Discussion, but these patterns may suggest some possible relationships between
personality factors and correct memory retrievals.
Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to evaluate the effects of initial testing on
subsequent misinformation using video materials in the social contagion paradigm. It was
predicted that if initial testing increased misinformation (i.e., a RES pattern), this would
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provide evidence for initial video materials as contributing to greater misinformation
suggestibility following testing. If, however, initial testing decreased misinformation (i.e.,
a PET pattern), this would provide evidence that the modality of study materials was not
related to testing effects on misinformation as a PET pattern has been found reliably with
static images (Huff et al., 2013; 2016; Pereverseff et al., 2020). Overall, the results of
Experiment 1 were mixed. Although initial testing produced a RES pattern on the final
free-recall test, this pattern did not extend to the source-monitoring test, as no differences
were found between groups regarding false source attributions for misinformation
objects.
While testing effects on misinformation were inconsistent across tests, initial
testing generally benefitted correct memory for objects in the video. Initial test
participants were more likely to correctly recall objects presented in the videos (i.e.,
retrieval practice; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), and they were marginally more likely to
correctly attribute touched and non-touched objects as being presented in the original
videos. These two patterns indicate that initial testing may lead to memory costs
regarding misinformation but may also produce memory benefits.
Correlations with the Big 5 Inventory produced different relationships between
misinformation and correct memory. Starting with misinformation, patterns were weak
and largely unreliable with only a positive trend found between Agreeableness and
misinformation recall. This pattern is consistent with Frost et al. (2013) who also reported
a positive relationship with Agreeableness, however this pattern was not found with
suggestibility in the source test. Thus, the relationship between Agreeableness and
misinformation may not occur when source details are queried. These patterns however
22

were inconsistent with the prediction that both Conscientious and Neuroticism would be
positively related to misinformation as neither of these relationships were reliable. For
correct memory, Neuroticism was positively correlated to both non-touched recall and
non-touched source attributions, indicating that more neurotic individuals may be more
likely to successfully encode and retrieve objects that were less focal in the videos given
the actor did not interact with them. Conscientiousness was negatively related to recall of
non-touched objects, but this pattern did not persist into the source test, suggestion that
Conscientiousness was less consistently associated with correct memory than
Neuroticism.
Given the mixed evidence for initial testing effects on misinformation,
Experiment 2 was designed to exaggerate testing effects on subsequent recall and source
recognition. Previous research has shown that testing effects on correct memory are often
more robust when a final test is delayed relative to being completed immediately (e.g.,
Karpicke & Roediger, 2006; Rowland, 2014, etc.). If testing is indeed more impactful
following a delay, then misinformation may similarly be more sensitive to testing delays.
Consistent with this possibility, Huff et al. (2016) reported that a reliable PET effect
emerged on free recall when a 48-hour delay occurred between the initial-test phase and
the misinformation and final test phases, but not when the misinformation/final test
phases occurred immediately. Moreover, final test delays are likely common in
eyewitness situations in which witness statements may not be gathered immediately
following events. The effects of delays on testing are therefore examined in Experiment 2
in which a 48-hour delay was similarly inserted between the misinformation phase and
the final recall/source-monitoring test phase.
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Experiment 2
Experiment 2 further examined the effects of initial testing on subsequent
misinformation but inserted a 48-hour delay between the initial test phase and the
misinformation and final test phases. Because testing often slows forgetting, it was
expected that initial testing would be more impactful on correct memory and
misinformation on a final test following a delay. The predictions aligned with Experiment
1: The emergence of an RES pattern would suggest that the video presentation of the
studied event contributes to increased susceptibility to misinformation, whereas a PET
pattern would suggest that video materials are not a contributing factor. Like Experiment
1, participants again completed the BFI-2. Based on the results of Experiment 1 (and
Frost et al., 2013), it was expected that a positive relationship would emerge between
Agreeableness and misinformation suggestibility, though Conscientiousness and
Neuroticism relationships were also examined given the previous patterns in the literature
(cf. Gudjonsson, 1983; Jackson & Balota, 2012).
Methods
Participants
One hundred and two participants were recruited through Prolific
(www.prolific.co), and The University of Southern Mississippi’s undergraduate research
pool. Participants were compensated for the study at a rate of $9.50 per hour or with class
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to two the Initial Test group (n = 49) or the
No Test group (n = 53), All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were
proficient English speakers.
Materials
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The materials were the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1, with one exception. There was an
addition of a 48-hour delay between the initial recall and the misinformation phase for all
participants.
Results
Correct Recall
Proportions of correct recall for the No-Initial Test group and the Initial-Test
group for the initial and final tests in Experiment 2 are reported in Table 1. A 2(Touched)
× 2(Test) repeated-measures ANOVA was used to analyze recall differences between the
initial test and the final test within the Initial Test group. Recall rates for touched objects
in the videos were higher than non-touched objects (.50 vs. .28; for the mean for touched
and non-touched objects, respectively), F(1, 48) = 202.90, MSE = .01, ηp2 = .81, and
correct recall increased from the initial test to the final test (.37 vs. .41), F(1, 48) = 10.04,
MSE = .01, ηp2 = .17. An interaction was also found, F(1, 48) = 39.00, MSE = .01, ηp2 =
.45. Follow-up tests indicated that the increased recall on the final test was only found on
non-touched objects (.24 vs. .31, for initial and final tests, respectively), t(48) = 48) =
6.41, SEM = .01, d = 0.62, but not for touched objects (.50 vs. .50), t < 1. The increase
between initial and final tests despite a delay is likely due to participants being exposed
to correctly studied objects during the misinformation phase.
To evaluate the presence of a retrieval-practice benefit, a 2(Touched) × 2(Test
Group) mixed ANOVA was used to compare final recall performance between the two
test groups. Touched objects were again recalled at a higher rate than non-touched objects
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(.45 vs. .29) F(1, 100) = 239.26, MSE = .01, ηp2 = .79. Similar to Experiment 1, initial
testing led to higher correct recall than no initial testing (.41 vs. .33), F(1, 100) = 7.03,
MSE = .04, ηp2 = .07. A marginal interaction was also found, F(1, 100) = 3.14, MSE =
.01, p = .08, ηp2 = .03, which reflected a slightly larger testing benefit for touched objects
(.41 vs. .50), t(100) = 2.75, SEM = .03, d = 0.55, than non-touched objects (.26 vs. .31),
t(100) = 2.15, SEM .02, d = 0.43. Finally, recall for the No-Initial-Test group was
compared to the initial recall test in the Initial-Test group. Touched objects were again
recalled at a higher rate than non-touched objects (.45 vs. .25), F(1, 100) = 269.56, MSE
= .01, ηp2 = .73. The main effect of test type was not reliable, F(1, 100) = 1.76, MSE =
.04, p = .19, but a significant interaction was found, F(1, 100) = 21.49, MSE = .01, ηp2 =
.18. This interaction reflected higher recall for touched objects during the initial test in
the Initial-Test group than the recall test in the No-Initial-Test group (.50 vs. .41), t(100)
= 2.72, SEM = .03, d = 0.54, but no difference between the tests for non-touched objects
(.24 vs. .26), t < 1.
False Recall
Table 1 also reports proportions of falsely suggested objects recalled on the final
test. Again, a reliable misinformation effect was found, with suggested objects falsely
recalled at a higher rate than non-suggested control objects (.36 vs. .07), F(1, 100) =
66.49, MSE = .09, ηp2 = .40. However, unlike Experiment 1, initial testing had no effect
on misinformation rates as neither the main effect nor the interaction were reliable, both
Fs < 1. Thus, following a delay, neither a RES nor a PET pattern were in evidence.
Source-Monitoring Recognition
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Proportions of source attribution for misinformation objects as a function of test
group are reported in Table 2. Total scores for false source attributions were calculated as
in Experiment 1. A reliable misinformation effect was again found on the source test with
a higher rate of suggested objects falsely attributed to the videos than control objects (.89
vs. .51), F(1, 100) = 126.68, MSE = .06, ηp2 = .56. Replicating Experiment 1, testing
produced no effect on suggestibility as both the main effect of testing and the interaction
were unreliable, both Fs < 1. Correct source attributions of suggested objects (i.e., “not
presented” source responses) were compared between test groups. Correct attributions
were equivalent between the Initial Test and No-Initial test groups, both for objects that
were suggested (.14 vs. .09), t(100) = 1.46, SEM = .04, p = .15, and for misinformation
control objects (.48 vs. .50), t < 1.
Finally, correct source attributions for objects presented in the videos were
analyzed between test groups (proportions reported in Table 3). Correct source
attributions did not differ between touched and non-touched objects (.54 vs. .50), F(1,
100) = 2.08, MSE = .04, p = .15, however, initial testing improved correct source
attributions overall relative to the No-Initial-Test group (.55 vs. .50), F(1, 100) = 5.90,
MSE = .03, ηp2 = .06, indicating a retrieval-practice benefit on the source-recognition test.
The interaction was not significant, F(1, 100) = 1.51, MSE = .04, p = .22. Thus,
completing an initial test appeared to improve overall final test accuracy relative to no
initial testing by improving both correct recall and source recognition while producing no
effect on misinformation (i.e., no RES pattern).
Correlations with the Big-5 Personality Inventory

27

Correlations between memory responses and factors in the BFI-2 (Soto & John,
2017) were again computed. Table 4 reports the mean BFI-2 responses for the five
factors as a function of test group. Table 6 reports the correlation matrix representing the
relationship between memory measures and the BFI-2 factors.
Like Experiment 1, to maximize available power to detect relationships between
personality measures and memory responses, correlations were collapsed across the two
test groups (though again, test group did not moderate these relationships, Fs < 1).
Starting with misinformation recall and source misattributions to suggested objects, there
were no significant correlations with any of the personality factors (largest r = -.17, p =
.10). For correct memory, a significant relationship was found between Agreeableness
and correct recall of touched objects (r = .35, p < .001), and correct recall of non-touched
objects (r = .22, p = .03). A relationship was also found between Conscientiousness and
correct recall of touched objects (r = .21, p = .04. However, for correct source
attributions, only the relationship between Conscientiousness and correct source
attributions of presented objects was found (r = .22, p = .03), suggesting that only
Conscientiousness may be positively related to correct memory of touched objects
consistently, following a delay.
Discussion
The goal of Experiment 2 was to evaluate the effects of initial testing on
subsequent misinformation after a 48-hour delay using video materials. It was expected
the misinformation pattern reported in Experiment 1 would be exaggerated following a
delay due to participants’ decreased memory for the initial event prior to receiving
misinformation. As in Experiment 1, recall rates for touched objects were higher than
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non-touched objects, and additionally, correct recall increased from the initial test to the
final test. Furthermore, a testing effect occurred in which initial testing led to higher
correct recall than no initial testing with a greater benefit for touched objects over nontouched objects. Although a reliable misinformation effect was found, the delay used in
Experiment 2 did not increase this effect as anticipated. Instead, there were no differences
in misinformation rates between test groups. Regarding source attributions, testing
produced no effect on suggestibility and instead produced a retrieval-practice benefit on
the source-recognition test.
Turning to correlations with the personality measures, no relationships were
found between any of the personality measures and misinformation suggestibility. This is
counter to the positive relationship found in Experiment 1 and reported by Frost et al.
(2013) between suggestibility and Agreeableness. Additionally, despite the initial
predictions, neither Conscientiousness nor Neuroticism again were associated with
suggestibility, indicating that the relationship between these personality factors and
suggestibility are unreliable. Finally, for correct memory, Conscientiousness was
positively related to touched object recall and source attributions, an observation in line
with previous attentional findings by Jackson and Balota (2012).
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General Discussion
Using videos based on the social contagion of memory paradigm (Roediger et al.,
2001), the present study examined the effects of initial testing on subsequent
misinformation. Following the presentation of the videos, half of participants were tested
on objects presented in the videos while the other half were untested and completed a
filler task. All participants were then presented with sets of false objects via an implied
social source. Overall, completing an initial test generally improved both correct recall
and correct source-monitoring for objects that were presented as participants were better
able to attribute whether objects were touched or not by the actor in the videos. This
retrieval-practice benefit (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) was found both when final tests
were completed within the same experimental session as the initial video presentation
(Experiment 1) and when misinformation and final tests were delayed 48-hours
(Experiment 2). Misinformation patterns, however, were largely test invariant. Although
initial testing was found to increase suggestibility in recall in Experiment 1, this pattern
was eliminated when participants specified source details in a subsequent recognition
test. Furthermore, testing was found to have no effect on misinformation following the
delay in Experiment 2.
A secondary purpose of this study was to evaluate potential personality
moderators on correct memory and suggestibility using the Big 5 inventory. Based on
previous literature, it was predicted the misinformation suggestibility would be positively
related to Agreeableness (Frost et al., 2013), Neuroticism (Gudjonsson, 1983), and
Conscientiousness, due to reported attentional benefits for individuals high in
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Conscientiousness (Jackson & Balota, 2012). Although Experiment 1 yielded a positive
relationship between Agreeableness and misinformation recall—a pattern consistent with
Frost et al.—this pattern did not persist in Experiment 2 with a delay. Furthermore, no
relationships were found between misinformation suggestibility and any other personality
factor, including Neuroticism and Conscientiousness, suggesting that relationships
between the Big 5 personality factors and misinformation suggestibility are either
nonexistent or small and unreliable. Additionally, there were a few significant
correlations that emerged with correct memory (e.g., Conscientiousness and
Extraversion), but again, these were not found consistently across experiments.
The current experiments were designed to provide an additional evaluation of
testing effects on subsequent misinformation given initial testing has been reported to
both increase misinformation (i.e., RES; Chan et al., 2009; 2017; LaPaglia et al., 2014;
LaPaglia & Chan, 2014) and decrease misinformation (i.e., PET; Memon et al., 2010;
Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011; Gabbert, et al., 2012; Huff et al., 2013; 2016; Pereverseff et
al., 2020). Although several methodological details have been evaluated (e.g., LaPaglia &
Chan, 2014; Pereverseff et al., 2020), studies that have found a RES pattern generally use
videos to depict an initial witnessed event, while studies that have reported a PET pattern
(e.g., Huff et al., 2013; 2016) have used static images. The present study converted these
static images into videos which were more likely to mimic the dynamic events that are
depicted to real-world witnesses. Despite the potential modality patterns in the literature,
initial testing generally had no effect on subsequent suggestibility, as a null testing
pattern was the predominant finding in both experiments. Thus, initial testing following
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witnessing video materials does not appear to be a primary contributing factor to RES
patterns, nor do video materials appear to contribute to a PET pattern.
One possible reason for the discrepant findings of RES and PET patterns may be
due to the narrative component associated with the videos used in RES literature (e.g., an
episode of Flashpoint; LaPaglia & Chan, 2019). Videos in these earlier studies contained
a clear narrative component, unlike the videos used in the present study which simply
depicted a person moving through various household scenes and interacting with objects
with no clear narrative explaining the purpose of the movements or why some objects
were touched relative to others. However, it is important to note that narrative features
may not be consistently available in all eyewitnessed events. For example, for a crime
that happens randomly, a witness may only view a snippet of the event and lack a
narrative or details necessary to explain why the event occurred. Furthermore, common
eyewitness events like car accidents or thefts are often random and unexpected,
suggesting that story components may be exceptional features of witnessed events rather
than standard. Therefore, if the utilization of a story narrative is responsible for RES
patterns, then this could suggest that RES is a byproduct of the paradigm rather than a
byproduct of an initial test.
Another explanation for this discrepancy in the occurrence of RES or PET may be
due to the narrative of the misinformation instead of the initial event, as suggested by
Chan et al. (2017). It has been found that when participants are presented with a cohesive
narrative containing misinformation, a RES pattern has been found. However, when the
narrative is made disjointed, this effect was eliminated (LaPaglia 2013; Experiment 3A).
Building upon this, LaPaglia and Chan (2019) also compared the effects of initial testing
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on contextual information for questions and narratives. A RES pattern was found both for
questions and when the contextual information was cohesive, and the information was
reinstated during misinformation. The present study did not use a narrative to organize
the presentation of objects in a post-event narrative and instead presented a set of
seemingly random objects that were schematically consistent with the scenes including
errors. While misinformation in the social contagion paradigm may be disjointed, it is
important to note that Pereverseff et al. (2020) reported a PET pattern using the social
contagion paradigm both when participants viewed misleading questions and a
misleading narrative with false objects, suggesting that the cohesion within the post-event
materials is not likely a contributing factor. It is possible, therefore, that some
combination of these characteristics (i.e., initial video materials with a narrative; initial
static images with misleading questions) may contribute to when RES/PET patterns
emerge, and further, these combinations could be critical for when testing can help or
hurt memory accuracy.
Although initial effects of testing were largely invariant on subsequent
misinformation, it is important to emphasize that initial testing produced a net positive on
memory accuracy. Indeed, the finding that initial testing can promote correct
remembering of presented objects—both touched and non-touched—indicates that
querying witnesses for their memories initially is beneficial. The present study adds to a
large literature showing the benefits of retrieval practice while also highlighting how
initial testing can promote correct memory for free-recall and source-monitoring in the
face of suggested errors. Thus, testing appears to be an effective tool for promoting
eyewitness memory.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Due to restrictions in place by the ongoing pandemic (Spring 2021 - Fall 2021),
all participants completed the study online, not in a research lab facility. As a result, the
lack of monitoring by an experimenter in a controlled environment may have resulted in
participants paying less attention to the experiment or being vulnerable to distractions in
their surroundings. Future studies should continue to assess factors driving RES and PET
patterns using a controlled lab setting. Finally, future research may benefit from testing
narrative versus non-narrative initial event study materials, as this may be a provide a key
beginning in solving the RES and PET debate within the eyewitness misinformation
literature while providing more insight into overall memory for witnessed events. Finally,
future research may wish to continue the work of LaPaglia (2013). Because the present
study presented misinformation in a disjointed manner via experimenter-made recall
sheets, the addition of a narrative misinformation component may provide the potential to
further examine these two patterns.
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Conclusion
Across two experiments, a testing benefit for correct memory occurred. Although
in Experiment 1, a RES pattern emerged for scenes where misinformation was presented,
this pattern was not in evidence in the source monitoring test or in Experiment 2 after a
delay occurred. Instead, misinformation was found to be largely invariant to initial
testing, supporting neither an RES pattern nor a PET pattern. Given the general benefit
that testing had on correct recall and correct source attributions of objects presented in the
scenes, testing was overall beneficial to memory accuracy and does not appear to be
costly to eyewitness retrieval. Additionally, correlations with the Big 5 personality
factors were assessed, however these factors were found to be inconsistent across
experiments and with relatively small magnitudes of reliability. The Big 5 factors are
therefore unlikely to be related to correct memory or misinformation effects following
eyewitnessed events or when the relationships are small.

35

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1
Depicts study design
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Table 1
Mean (95% CI) Proportions of Correct Recall and False Recall of Misinformation Items
and Extra-List Intrusions as a Function of Initial Test Group for Experiments 1 and 2.

Experiment 1 (Immediate Test)
No Initial Test
Group
N

39

Initial Test
Group

Experiment 2 (Delayed Test)
No Initial Test
Group

Initial Test
Group

39

53

49

Correct Recall
Touched

.42 (.06)

.51 (.06)

.43 (.03)

.51 (.07)

Not Touched

.22 (.04)

.29 (.05)

.25 (.04)

.29 (.05)

.24 (.06)

.37 (.10)

.43 (.10)

.40 (.11)

Misinfo. Control .04 (.03)

.03 (.03)

.06 (.05)

.03 (.04)

False Recall
Misinfo.

________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2
Mean (95% CI) Proportions of Source Attributions for Misinformation Items as a
Function of Initial Test Group for Experiments 1 and 2.

No Initial Test Group
Misinfo.

Initial Test Group

Misinfo. Controls

Misinfo.

Misinfo. Controls

Experiment 1: Immediate Test
“Touched”

.36 (.10)

.20 (.07)

.33 (.09)

.19 (.07)

“Not Touched”

.42 (.10)

.31 (.10)

.40 (.09)

.26 (.09)

Total Errors

.78 (.10)

.51 (.12)

.73 (.10)

.45 (.11)

“Not Presented”

.22 (.10)

.48 (.12)

.26 (.10)

.54 (.11)

Experiment 2: Delayed Test
“Touched”

.41 (.08)

.15 (.06)

.35 (.08)

.15 (.06)

“Not Touched”

.51 (.07)

.37 (.08)

.52 (.08)

.35 (.07)

Total Errors

.92 (.05)

.53 (.09)

.87 (.06)

.50 (.09)

“Not Presented”

.08 (.05)

.48 (.09)

.14 (.06)

.50 (.09)
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Table 3
Mean (95% CI) Proportions of Correct Source Attributions for Objects Correctly
Presented in the Videos as a Function of Initial Test Group for Experiments 1 and 2.
No Initial Test Group

Initial Test Group

Experiment 1: Immediate Test
“Touched”

.61 (.07)

.62 (.07)

“Not Touched”

.41 (.07)

.52 (.05)

“Not Presented”

.59 (.10)

.65 (.09)

“Touched”

.50 (.05)

.59 (.06)

“Not Touched”

.49 (.05)

.51 (.05)

“Not Presented”

.67 (.06)

.76 (.06)

Experiment 2: Delayed Test
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Table 4
Mean BFI-2 responses as a function of test group

No Initial Test Group
Initial Test Group
________________________________________________________________________
Experiment 1: Immediate Test
Openness
3.65
3.72
Conscientiousness

3.15

3.68

Extraversion

3.94

3.03

Agreeableness

2.74

3.80

Neuroticism

3.82

3.11

Openness

3.72

3.72

Conscientiousness

3.56

3.68

Extraversion

2.95

3.03

Agreeableness

3.74

3.80

Neuroticism

3.17

3.11

Experiment 2: Delayed Test
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Table 5
Experiment 1 Correlations Between Variables

Touched Recall
Non-Touched Recall
MI Presented
MI Control
MI Presented Source

Touched
Recall

NonTouched
Recall

MI
Presented

MI Control

MI
Presented
Source

MI
Presented
Correct

Correct
Source NonTouched

Correct
Source
Touched

-

.777**

.281*

N

E

O

A

C

-0.087

-.251*

.248*

0.216

.313**

0.1

-0.17

0.136

-0.02

-0.139

-

.289*

-0.037

-

-0.088

-0.18

0.178

.297**

0.179

.279*

-0.173

0.188

-0.082

-.240*

0.136

-0.161

-0.014

0.112

-0.172

0.115

0.16

0.21

0.113

-

0.195

-0.19

0.082

0.07

0.064

0.04

-0.126

-0.023

-0.027

-

-.996**

0.204

0.103

0.008

0.032

-0.071

0.028

0.053

-

-0.192

-0.094

-0.001

-0.037

0.076

-0.03

-0.054

-

-0.087

.247*

-.248*

-0.127

-0.163

-0.181

-

0.091

-0.097

0.023

-0.052

-0.041

-

-.594**

-0.149

-.587**

-.642**

-

.282*

.392**

.434**

-

.428**

0.162

-

.543**

MI Presented Correct
Correct Source Non-Touched
Correct Source Touched
N
E
O
A
C

-

Notes. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Touched Recall
= correct recall for touched items on a final test, Non-Touched Recall = correct recall for non-touched items on a final test, MI
Presented = Misinformation that was presented to participants that were reported on a final test, MI Control = Misinformation that
was not presented to participants that were reported on a final test, MI Presented Source = Misinformation that was falsely attributed
to the videos on the source monitoring test, MI Presented Correct = Misinformation that was correctly attributed to “not presented,”
Correct Source Non-Touched =Items that were correctly labeled as “not touched” on the source monitoring test, Correct Source
Touched = Items that were correctly labeled as “touched” on the source monitoring test, N = Neuroticism, E =Extraversion, O =
Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Contentiousness
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Table 6
Experiment 2 Correlations Between Variables

Touched Recall
NonTouched Recall
MI Presented
MI Control
MI Presented Source

Touched
Recall

NonTouched
Recall

MI
Presented

MI
Control

MI
Presented
Source

MI
Presented
Correct

Correct
Source
NonTouched

-

.774**
-

-.036

.118

-.182

.183

-.023

0.284**

-.042

.048

-

-.092

.395**

-.391**

-

.163
-

-

MI Presented Correct
Correct Source NonTouched
Correct Source Touched
N
E
O
A
C

Correct
Source
Touched

N

.082

.516**

.092

0.344**

-.052

-.157
-.992**

E

O

A

C

-.165

.059

.123

0.345**

.207*

-.136

-.019

.168

.222*

-.041

.085

.123

-.166

.062

.100

.010

.089

-.034

.047

-.089

-.035

.031

-.194

-.025

.034

.048

.041

.067

-.126

-.012

.043

-.037

-.040

-.043

-.086

.122

.002

-

-224*

.086

.077

-.023

-.081

-.009

-

-.037

.113

.013

.183

.218*

-

-.321**

.010

-.189

-.348**

-

.131

.004

.373**

-

.121

.142

-

.368**
-

Notes. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Touched Recall
= correct recall for touched items on a final test, Non-Touched Recall = correct recall for non-touched items on a final test, MI
Presented = Misinformation that was presented to participants that were reported on a final test, MI Control = Misinformation that
was not presented to participants that were reported on a final test, MI Presented Source = Misinformation that was falsely attributed
to the videos on the source monitoring test, MI Presented Correct = Misinformation that was correctly attributed to “not presented,”
Correct Source Non-Touched =Items that were correctly labeled as “not touched” on the source monitoring test, Correct Source
Touched = Items that were correctly labeled as “touched” on the source monitoring test, N = Neuroticism, E =Extraversion, O =
Openness, A = Agreeableness, C = Contentiousness
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